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Both the government and the industry are keenly promoting the use of 
electronic signatures. It is assumed that the widespread use of 
electronic signatures will encourage greater use of the Internet as a 
means to buy goods and services. This two-part article looks at the 
evidential issues relating to electronic signatures, and illustrates the 
weakness of the infrastructure, which in turn highlights the risks that 
both users and recipients encounter \vhen using electronic signatures.
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WHY ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES ARE USED
I t is argued that consumers do not use the internet widely to purchase goods and services because of the perceived threat to security of personal data, in 
particular of the possible misuse of credit card details. In 
addition, it is also assumed that businesses selling goods and 
services over the Internet are concerned about the integrity, 
confidentiality, authenticity and non-repudiability of 
messages sent electronically. The author is not convinced of
these assumptions, and has previously suggested in this r ' i j oo
Journal that the reason people do not buy from business 
with a presence on the internet in the volumes predicted are 
related to more fundamental issues, rather than a lack 
(perceived or not) of security on the internet. This is a view 
shared by the eminent cryptographer Ross Anderson, 
amongst others, \vho argues that the overwhelming majority 
of cryptographic support systems will be concerned with 
protecting intellectual property rights.
Regardless of the volumes of certifying certificates 
issued and used, the reasons for using an individual
' o
certifying certificate are as follows:
  To ensure the authenticity of the information. When>
sending or receiving information or placing an order,
o o 1 o '
both parties need to know the sender of the message is 
the person they claim to be. There is a need to 
authenticate the identity of the sender.
  To demonstrate the integrity and accuracy of the message, 
because it is important to know if the content of the 
message has not been tampered with.
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  To prevent the person making the statement from 
denying that they made the statement. This is called 
non-repudiation in the security industry.
In the normal course of events, many thousands of 
transactions take place over the Internet each day without 
recourse to the use of cryptographic devices. Not only are 
goods and services bought and sold, but also individuals 
and businesses in ever increasing volumes conduct
o
correspondence by way of e-mail. People using the 
Internet do not tend to use electronic signatures to
o
conduct business. In the same way that a consumer will 
enter a contract to purchase an item from a business at a 
distance after viewing an illustration of a product in a 
catalogue or newspaper, for instance, so people use their 
intuition to gauge the risk they may be taking when 
entering a contract over the Internet. Even where 
strangers enter contracts with each other, people tend to 
rely on the information they glean from conversations over 
the telephone, face-to-face meetings, advertising, brandI ' o ' o'
images and references from friends.
Whilst individual certifying certificates can help to 
confirm the identity of a consumer, the use of such a 
certificate does not necessarily help the consumer 
determine
(a) whether the business they purport to be entering a 
contract with exists, or
(b) if the business exists, whether and when it will 
supply the goods or services ordered as promised 
or
(c) if the web site they have viewed is a ghost site, 
purely intent on capturing their identity or credit 
card details or both, with a view to using such 
information fraudulently.
Conversely, it is perfectly possible for certifying 
certificates to provide authentication in relation to the 
points raised above. For instance, where the visitor has 
logged on to a web site with a secure connection, thev can
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click on to the secure icon to follow the trail to look at and 
check the certificate sitting behind the web site. The 
practical point about human behaviour, which is not the 
subject of this article, indicates that certifying certificates 
may never be used widely. However, even if human 
behaviour was such that certifying certificates were widely 
used, the potential user faces serious practical problems 
before they can use a an electronic signature. Individual 
certifying certificates are difficult to buy, install on a 
computer and use properly. It is probably for these latter 
reasons that consumers will not use such certificates 
widely.
HOW THIS PAPER IS ARRANGED
The aim of this paper is to introduce the reader to the 
range of issues that need to be considered when seeking to 
adduce an electronic signature into evidence. It may be 
that the relying party wishes to show that the parry affixing 
the electronic signature to a document intended to be 
legally bound to the terms of the document. Alternatively, 
the party whose electronic signature was used may 
challenge the assertion that they affixed or authorised the 
fixing of their electronic signature to the document in 
question. As a result, it is felt appropriate to set out the 
legal framework before considering the infrastructure
o o
relating to electronic signatures. The problems relating to 
the way electronic signatures are created and used \\ill 
highlight the tvpes of evidential issues that mav arise in the
O O J I J
future.
First, the terms used in this paper are considered. There 
follows a short discussion of manuscript signatures and the 
nature of an electronic signature. Consideration is then 
given to the admissibility and legal presumptions of 
electronic signatures. Thereafter, 'non-repudiation' is 
discussed before considering the reliability of the 
certifying certificate and the issues that must be 
considered in assessing the evidential weight to be given to 
the evidence. Finally, a brief outline of the technical 
structure is given before setting out the weaknesses, which 
will have a bearing on the evidential weight of an electronico o
signature.
TERMS
The terms 'electronic signature' and 'digital signature' 
are used interchangeably. An electronic document can be 
sent with the following attributes:
  An electronic document can be sent in its plain text.
  Alternatively, an electronic document can be sent in 
plain text with an electronic signature attached to it in 
accordance with the provisions of s.7(l) of the Electronic 
Communications Act 2000 (the Act), ss 7, II and 12 which 
came into force on July 25, 2000 in accordance with the 
provisions of the Electronic Communications Act 2000 
(Commencement No /) Order 2000 (SI 2000 No 1798), 
which provides as follows:
7(1) In any legal proceedings-
an electronic signature incorporated into or logically 
associated with a particular electronic communication or 
particular electronic data, and
the certification by any person of such a signature,
shall each be admissible in evidence in relation to any 
question as to the authenticity of the communication or data 
or as to the integrity of the communication or data?
  Further, an electronic document can be sent in 
encrypted text with an electronic signature attached to 
it.
In this paper, the following definitions have been 
adopted:
The term 'electronic signature' is the incorporation of 
an electronic or digital method (comprising a numerical 
value using a known mathematical procedure associated 
with the private cryptographic key of the sender) to an 
electronic communication, which is:
  unique to the person using it, and
  which is capable of being verified, and
  is linked to the communication in such a way that if the 
content of the communication is changed, the electronic 
signature is invalidated.
For the purposes of this paper, 'electronic signature' has 
the specific meaning attributed to it in s.7(2) of the Act, as 
follows:
(2) For the purposes oj this section an electronic signature is so 
much of anything in electronic Jorm as-
(a) is incorporated into or otherwise logically associated with 
any electronic communication or electronic data; and
(b) purports to be so incorporated or associated jor the purpose 
of being used in establishing the authenticity of the 
communication or data, the integrity oj the 
communication or data, or both.
An 'individual certifying certificate' means the 
individual certificate issued bv a trusted third party (such 
as a certification authority'), which identifies a natural or 
legal person and indicates that a public key and a private 
key has been issued to the natural or legal person.
The meaning of a digital signature as adopted by 
ISO/IEC 7498-2: OSI Basic Reference Model - Security 
Architecture will be used in this paper. This is data appended 21
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to, or a cryptographic transformation of, a data unit that 
allows a recipient of the data to prove the source and 
integrity of the data unit. The digital signature mechanism 
defines two processes: that of
(a) the signing of a data unit by the person initiating the 
signature, which is a private action, and
(b) verifying a signed data unit by using the procedures and 
information publicly available, the process of which is 
discussed later in this paper.
If there is a difference between an electronic signature 
and a digital signature, it is the fine distinction between:
  the incorporation of data that purports to be 
incorporated or associated to help establish the 
authenticity or integrity of the communication, and
  the ability to prove the source and integrity of the data 
unit.
It can be argued that the digital signature can provide a 
higher degree of certainty for the relying party, subject to 
the verification process and the possibility that a digital 
signature can be removed from a document in electronic 
format without trace.
MANUSCRIPT SIGNATURE
The electronic signature is often compared to the 
manuscript signature. Whilst there is a similarity in 
purpose between the two, an electronic signature 
comprises more attributes than a manuscript signature. A 
manuscript signature, which can be a full name, initials, a 
nickname or a seal, can serve a number of functions:
  To provide evidence of the identity of the person 
creating the document, thereby associating that person 
with the document they have signed, such as a will.
  It can demonstrate that the signatory approves the 
content of a document.
  Is a declaration of the signatory's intention that the 
document is to have legal effect and acts as proof of the 
event of signature. : " *
  By signing a document, the signatory is reminded of the 
significance of the act and the need to act within the 
provisions of the document.
As a corollary, the party receiving the document 
containing a manuscript signature recognises that the 
other party affirms the content of the document, they are 
assured of the identity of the signatory and they are in 
receipt of the proof of the source and contents of the 
document.
However, it is well known that manuscript signatures are 
forged. To prevent this problem, and to test both the 
validity and the effectiveness of a manuscript signature, 
some documents require the signature to be affixed in the 
present of a witness or an authorised official. There is a
distinction between the form and function of a manuscript 
signature, and Professor Chris Reed notes in his article 
'what is a Signature?' 2000 (3) Journal of Information, Law 
and Technology (JILT), http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/00- 
3/reed.html that the modern approach to the validity of a 
manuscript signature emphasises function over form in the 
test for validity.
THE NATURE OF THE ELECTRONIC 
SIGNATURE
An electronic signature, in accordance with theo '
provisions of s.7(l) of the Act, can be admissible in 
evidence in relation to the authenticity of the 
communication or data and the integrity of the 
communication or data. In addition, an electronic 
signature serves other information-security purposes that 
manuscript signatures cannot:
  the recipient can determine whether the 
communication was altered after it was digitally signed
  as a result, a certifying certificate can provide assurance 
about the source and integrity of the document.
Electronic signatures can be produced in different 
formats, including a manuscript signature that is scanned 
into a document, an electronic representation of a hand 
written signature or a digital representation of a biometric, 
such as a retina scan or fingerprint.
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ELECTRONIC 
SIGNATURE
The Act permits an electronic signature to perform a 
similar role to that of a manuscript signature. The Act 
provides, in s.7(3) for any person to certify that the 
electronic signature is a valid means of establishing the 
authenticity and integrity of the communication or data or 
both:
(3) For the purposes of this section an electronic signature 
incorporated into or associated with a particular electronic 
communication or particular electronic data is certified by 
any person if that person (whether before or after the 
making of the communication) has made a statement 
confirming that-
(a) the signature,
(b) a means of producing, communicating or verifying 
the signature, or
(c) a procedure applied to the signature,
is (either alone or in combination with other factors) a valid 
means of establishing the authenticity of the communication 
or data, the integrity of the communication or data, or both.
It appears, therefore, that the person or organisation 
certifying the electronic signature may need to certify 
before or after or both before and after sending the 
communication, that the signature is authentic and the
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integrity of the data or communication is therefore not to 
be questioned. From a practical point of view, the 
certification process will probably occur before the 
sending of the communication, although there may be 
circumstances where the certification process can occur 
after the communication is sent. The actual certification 
will probably be an assertion by the person or organisation 
certifying the signature that there is an association linking 
the public key with the private key. It is the provision of 
this extrinsic evidence that is necessary to provide 
evidence of the user's identity.
THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION OF AN 
ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE
It should be noted that the electronic signature is 
admissible in evidence in relation to the authenticity or 
integrity of the communication, and that the 
communication is deemed to have a legal effect (s.2(a)(iii) 
of the Act is authority on this latter point). Section 7(1) of 
the Act provides for a two-stage process to ensure an 
electronic signature can be admissible in evidence for the 
purposes of the Act:
  First, by s.7(l)(a) the electronic signature must be 
incorporated into or logically associated with a 
particular electronic communication or data, and
  Second, by s.7(l)(b) there must be a certification 
process where a statement is produced which links the 
key widi the person, including, but not limited to, die 
undertaking of checks on the identify of the individual
o J
or corporate entity.
The second stage of the process infers that it is the duty 
of the trusted third party to certify that a key linked to a 
person or legal entity is admissible. It seems, therefore, 
that if a recipient receives an electronic communication 
which is (a) signed widi an electronic signature, and (b) 
the certifying certificate relating to the electronic signature 
can be verified by a trusted third party, the communication 
in question is admissible in evidence, subject to the 
provisions of s. 15 (2) of the Act.
THE MEANING OF NON-REPUDIATION
In legal terms, the meaning of 'non-repudiation' is 
different to that used in the technical cryptographic sense. 
A manuscript signature can be repudiated for a number of 
reasons, including:
  the signature is a forgery
  whilst not a forgery, the signature was obtained as a 
result of unconscionable conduct by a party to a 
transaction fraud instigated by a third party undue 
influence exerted by a tiiird party.
Legal meaning
In civil proceedings, the Judicial Studies Board indicate 
that a certifying certificate may be hearsay evidence as to
the identity of the public key, and if a party relies on such 
a certificate, they must meet the requirements relating to 
notice of this evidence in accordance with section 2 of the 
Civil Evidence Act 1995 and die provisions of Part 33 of the 
Civil Procedure Rules. Once the party relying on the public 
key provides the relevant notice and particulars, it will be 
for the other party to raise an objection as to the 
authenticity or otherwise of the certifying certificate. A 
party to civil litigation is taken to admit, in accordance 
with Part 3 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the authenticity of 
a document disclosed to them under Part 32, Rule 19(1) 
of the Rules unless they serve notice that they wish the 
document to be proved at trial.
As far as criminal proceedings are concerned, a judge 
will be required to consider whether a certificate is 
admissible under the terms of s.24 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1988 and s.68 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984.
Technical cryptographic meaning
The term "non-repudiation" in the cryptographic sense 
for technical purposes is a property, attained through 
cryptographic methods, which prevents the person 
sending the message from denying they sent the message, 
as well as denying the origin, submission, delivery and 
integrity of the content. This technical meaning of the 
term has begun to be used in a legal sense by vendors of 
public key infrastructure, which in turn has had tended to 
confuse legislators. It has been suggested that the technical
O CO
response by the International Organisation for 
Standardisation is either to deny the right of the individual 
to repudiate an electronic signature or shifts the burden of 
proof from the recipient to the alleged user.
Repudiating electronic signatures
A key issue with respect to electronic signatures is the 
connection between the mental state of the person who 
may wish to be bound by the affixing of the electronic 
signature to a communication, and the act of affixing the 
electronic signature to the electronic message. The 
following issues are pertinent when establishing a nexus 
between the electronic communication and the electronic 
signature:
  whether the genuine user intended to be bound by the 
contents of the electronic document
  if another person used the electronic signature without 
authorisation, how they obtained access to the certifying 
certificate
  who should bear responsibility for the unauthorised use.
CHALLENGING AN ELECTRONIC 
SIGNATURE
An electronic signature can be challenged for a number 
of reasons: 23
Amicus Curiae Issue 45 January/'February 2003
24
  where the person whose certifying certificate is used, 
claim they did not authorise the affixing of the key 
number to the document (this could be because an 
unauthorised person gained access to and used the 
certifying certificate, such as a member of the family, 
fellow employee or a hacker),
  the communication was sent with the electronic 
signature affixed, but the sender did not intend the 
communication to have anv legal effect,
J O 7
  the communication was sent with the electronic 
signature affixed, but the sender was coerced into 
sending the communication with the electronic 
signature affixed against their will,
  the communication was sent with the electronic 
signature affixed, but the sender revoked the certifying 
certificate,
  a certifying certificate may have been issued to an 
impostor.
The party challenging the admissibility of the electronic 
signature may be making either one or all of the following 
claims:
  the security used by the sender was not sufficient to 
prevent a third party from gaining access to their 
computer or system and making improper use of their 
key number,
  the procedures and technical abilities (such as the means 
of producing, communicating or verifying the signature) 
of the trusted third party were at fault,
  another organisation in the chain that links the sending 
of the electronic key and its receipt by the relying party, 
other than the trusted third party, was at fault.
Where the electronic signature is used to authenticate 
the document or to establish its authenticity a number of 
questions (some of which are set out above) must be 
considered, in accordance with s.!5(2) of the Act, which 
provides as follows:
In this Act- 
fa) references to the authenticity of any communication or data 
are references to any one or more of the following-
whether the communication or data comes jrom a 
particular person or other source;
whether it is accurately timed and dated; 
whether it is intended to have legal effect; 
and
(b) references to the integrity of any communication or data 
are references to whether there has been any tampering with 
or other modification of the communication or data.
Whichever party has the burden of proof will be 
required to submit evidence in response to the provisions
of s.l 5(2), together with any other extrinsic evidence thatv 7 7 o y
may be necessary to support the evidential burden.
The technology can, to a high degree of probability, 
prove that an electronic signature was affixed to a 
communication, but it cannot prove who used the 
signature. It is to be inferred that the holder of the 
certifying certificate affixed the electronic signature to the 
communication. The inference is weaker where there is 
little or no security in place on the computer or system 
upon which the certifying certificate sits.
RELIABILITY OF CERTIFYING 
CERTIFICATES AND BURDEN OF PROOF
Regardless of the technical meaning of the term 'non- 
repudiation', there are a number of problems that affect 
the reliability of certifying certificates, which are used toJ JO '
affix electronic signatures to an electronic communication:
  The confusing design on the screen, which can lead a 
user to activate the non-repudiation function without 
knowing the significance others attach to the certifying 
certificate.
  The software application may be set to send a receipt, 
but the recipient may not know the original sender sent 
the receipt. This also raises the question as to whether 
the receipt is authentic.
  Flaws in the design of the security system that permits 
one person to activate the non-repudiation bit in the 
electronic certificate of another user without 
permission.
  A design flaw in the public key infrastructure.
  The open nature of the Internet, which means hackers, 
could infect computers with a virus or Trojan horse that 
can be designed to steal private keys. The risks of 
hackers gaining entry to computers and networks 
increased with Digital Subscriber Link (DSL) and cable 
modem technologies. Without a DSL connection, theo '
computer is assigned a dynamic address each time a 
person connects to the Internet. Whilst connected on a 
DSL line, a computer may have either a permanent 
Internet Protocol (IP) address or a dynamic IP address, 
depending on the Internet service provider (ISP), 
although a customer can request a static address. Where 
a computer has a persistent connection to the Internet, 
the risk to attack and penetration by a third party is 
greater. A user is more vulnerable to attack by a hacker 
by having a permanent IP address.
The general rule with respect to signed documents is 
this: where a party" relies on a signed document and wishes 
to enforce the document against the signing party, the 
relying party must prove the signature is that of the signing 
party, or the document was authorised by the signing party. 
This is so where the signing party claims they did not sign 
the document, or if they did sign the document, they did
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so under duress. It is not for the signing party to prove 
that they did not authorise the document or sign it.
SHIFTING THE ONUS OF PROOF -
UNCITRAL
It has been suggested by Adrian McCullagh and Williamoo J o
Caelli in their article 'Non-Repudiation in the Digital 
Environment', 
http://firtsmonday.org/issues/issue5_8/mccullagVindex.htm 
1, that the technical meaning of 'non-repudiation' has the 
effect of either shifting the onus of proof from the recipient 
of the alleged electronic signature, or denying the right of the 
user of the certifying certificate to repudiate the certificate. 
Whilst it is clear that 'non-repudiation' has different 
meanings in the legal sense and the technical cryptographic 
sense, there is a further difference between the two, as 
pointed out by the same authors. That is the technical 
meaning relates to events that have taken place after the 
signature has taken place, and has no relation to the actual 
mechanism of the affixing of the digital certificate.
McCullagh and Caelli argue that Art. 13 of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce puts the 
onus of proof on the signatory to prove that the certifying 
certificate is a forgery. Article 13 reads as follows:
Article 13. Attribution of data messages
(1) A data message is that of the originator if it was sent by 
the originator itself.
(2) As between the originator and the addressee, a data 
message is deemed to be that of the originator if it was sent:
(a) by a person who had the authority to act on behalf oj 
the originator in respect of that data message; or
(b) by an information system programmed by, or on behalf 
of, the originator to operate automatically.
(3) As between the originator and the addressee, an addressee is 
entitled to regard a data message as being that of the 
originator, and to act on that assumption, if:
(a) in order to ascertain whether the data message was that of 
the originator, the addressee properly applied a procedure 
previously agreed to by the originatorJor that purpose; or
(b) the data message as received by the addressee resulted 
from the actions of a person whose relationship with the 
originator or with any agent oj the originator enabled that 
person to gain access to a method used by the originator 
to identify data messages as its own.
(4) Paragraph (3) does not apply:
(a) as oj the time when the addressee has both received 
notice Jrom the originator that the data message is not 
that of the originator, and had reasonable time to act 
accordingly; or .
(b) in a case \vithin paragraph (3)(b), at any time when 
the addressee knew or should have known, had it exercised
reasonable care or used any agreed procedure, that the 
data message was not that of the originator.
(5) Where a data message is that of the originator or is 
deemed to be that of the originator, or the addressee is entitled 
to act on that assumption, then, as between the originator and 
the addressee, the addressee is entitled to regard the data 
message as received as being what the originator intended to 
send, and to act on that assumption. The addressee is not so 
entitled when it knew or should have known, had it exercised 
reasonable care or used any agreed procedure, that the 
transmission resulted in any error in the data message as 
received.
(6) The addressee is entitled to regard each data message 
received as a separate data message and to act on that 
assumption, except to the extent that it duplicates another 
data message and the addressee knew or should have known, 
had it exercised reasonable care or used any agreed procedure, 
that the data message was a duplicate.
The following points are pertinent in relation to the 
provisions of Art. 1 3:
  The guidance note 83 indicates that Art. 13 originates in 
Art.5 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Credit Transfers. This defines the obligations of the sender 
of a payment order. Bearing in mind such a transfer would 
normally be subject to a contractual agreement between 
the parties, setting out the technical procedures agreed 
between each party (and any other parties in the chain) for 
such a transfer, it seems improbable that such a provision 
should affect a public key infrastructure which uses the 
open network of the internet.
  Guidance note 83 further states that it is not the 
purpose of Art. 13 to assign responsibility between the 
parties.
  Guidance note 84 reinforces the point of Art. 13(1), 
which is simply that the person originating the message 
is liable if they sent it.
  Earlier drafts of Art. 1 3 included, according to guidance 
note 92, an additional paragraph inferring that national 
law would be used to determine attribution of the 
authorship of the message.
Whilst the Article as presently drafted does not 
expressly make this point, nevertheless it seems clear from 
the provisions of Art. 13(1), that the onus of proof has 
indeed been reversed. The logic can be described as
o
follows:
  If a user chooses to have a certifying certificate, it isJ o '
assumed that the user will be the only person to use it.
  Where a recipient wishes to rely upon the electronic 
signature, provided they carry out adequate procedures 
to demonstrate the authenticity- of the certifying 
certificate under Art. 13(5) (i.e. undertake the verifying 
procedures set out for a digital signature), the recipient 25
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is permitted to assume the electronic signature is that of 
the sender. In this instance, the recipient is under a duty 
to carry out such procedures.
  Should the sender dispute they sent the electronic message 
with the electronic signature attached, it will be for the 
sender to demonstrate that they did not send the message.
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BACKGROUND
The most significant development in litigation in Canada in the past decade is the emergence of class actions. To understand the introduction of class 
actions into Canada, and their rapid growth, one needs to 
appreciate a basic fact   the high cost of litigation and its 
negative impact on access to justice. As in England, the 
cost of litigation in Canada is very high, and its impact is 
much exacerbated by the risks resulting from the loser pay 
rule (which is not ameliorated in Canada by "before the 
event" or "after the event" insurance). With the virtual 
disappearance of civil legal aid (except in family law) the 
result is that for the average, risk averse citizen, litigation 
is more or less out of the question unless the individual's
damages are very large, liability is reasonably clear, and a 
lawyer is willing to underwrite the cost of the litigation (on 
a no win, no pay basis).
Also, in Canada motor vehicle and industrial accident 
litigation do not play the central role that they do in the 
English litigation system. As far as industrial accidents are 
concerned, no fault workers' compensation schemes have 
replaced common law actions across Canada since the 1930s. 
Since the 1980s, motor vehicle injury cases have been dealt 
with by no fault schemes in almost two thirds of the country 
(Ontario and Quebec) unless a claimants' injuries are "serious 
and permanent". The relevance of all this is that it makes 
litigation lawyers hungry for product lines. Before the 
introduction of class actions, we had little or no mass tort
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